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In this chapter, we define “The Chinese Saving Puzzle” as the persistently high 
national saving rate at 34–53 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past 
three decades and a surge in the saving rate by 11 percentage points from 2000–2008. 
Using data from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) and Urban Household Surveys 
(UHS) supplemented by the findings from existing studies, we analyze the sources 
and causes of China’s high and rising saving rates in the government, corporate, and 
household sectors. Although the causes of China’s high saving are complex, we 
suggest that the evolving economic, demographic, and policy trends in the internal 
and external environments of the Chinese economy will likely lead to a decline in 
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Why Are Saving Rates So High in China? 
I. Introduction 
The spectacular economic growth of China in the past three decades has been 
associated with an equally remarkable high rate of saving. While the gross national 
saving as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) hovered just a little above 35 
percent in the 1980s, the average yearly rate climbed to 41 percent in the 1990s 
(Figure 1). Since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the growth 
in aggregate saving accelerated, surging from just below 38 percent in 2000 to an 
unprecedented 53 percent in 2007. China’s national saving rates since 2000 have been 
one of the highest worldwide, far surpassing the rates prevailing in Japan, South 
Korea, and other East Asian economies during the years of their miracle growth.
1  
  The high and rising aggregate saving and thus the low and declining share of 
consumption in the GDP constitute a central feature of the Chinese economy. High 
saving is not only closely related to domestic liquidity, investment, economic growth, 
and income distributions among firms, households, and the government but also to 
China’s international trade and capital flows. With the government’s concerted efforts 
to stimulate consumption and economic growth amid the recent financial crisis, 
increasing attention has been given on the issue of saving. Despite the bourgeoning 
literature on the subject, debates continue among economists regarding the underlying 
causes of China’s high rate of saving. Although some progress has been made to 
                                                            
1 These saving figures are based on information from the World Development Indicators (WDI). In 
2008, the gross national saving rate of China ranked the 9
th highest among 228 countries recorded in 
the WDI database. The eight economies with higher saving rates than China are all very small. Saudi 
Arabia and Singapore are the two economies of significant size with saving rates below that of China 
but were nonetheless above 50 percent.             2
understand household saving behaviors, a significant void in research on corporate 
and government saving still remains. The main objectives of this chapter are to 
document historical trends in Chinese aggregate saving using multiple data sources, 
analyze the forces that contributed to the recent rise in government, corporate, and 
household saving, and assess the prospects for Chinese national savings in the near 
f u t u r e .                     
We start with an overview of the major patterns in Chinese national saving in the 
past three decades. Drawing data from the World Development Indicators (WDI), 
China’s Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA), and other sources of aggregate statistics, we 
analyze and compare the aggregate saving in China with that of representative 
economies and major country groups. A breakdown of aggregate saving into the 
components of corporate, household, and government reveals major changes and 
sources of national saving over time. These analyses help define “The Chinese Saving 
Puzzle,” a set of unique features still not well understood in the existing literature of 
aggregate saving in the historical context of China and in light of international 
comparisons.   
We then proceed to examine the sources and causes of the rising saving of the 
government, corporate, and household sectors in China, focusing on the period of 
1999–2007. The sharp rise in government taxes on production and the collection of 
social security fees and income taxes were the dominant factors that increased the 
disposable income of the government. As the growth of income outpaced that of 
government consumption, the saving rate rose rapidly. The analysis of enterprise   3
behavior opens the discussion on data-related issues pertaining to the FFA, the main 
source of data for documenting aggregate saving in China. We examine the role of 
firm profitability, labor compensation and dividend, imperfect capital markets, and 
government policies in shaping corporate saving. Our analysis of household behavior 
relies on data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS) from six provinces, covering 
the period of 1992–2006. We summarize stylized facts on household saving and 
explore the factors we believe have driven the recent upward trend in household 
saving. The role played by unique institutions, policies, and reform processes in China 
is assessed. 
Lastly, based on the foregoing analysis of saving determinants, we argue that 
systematic forces, such as slower economic growth, moderate export expansion, and 
government plans to strengthen social welfare and population aging, are already set in 
to induce a decline in aggregate saving. A saving rate of above 50 percent of the GDP 
could already be a phenomenon of the past, and China would likely enter an era of a 
more balanced growth. 
 
 
II. Long-term Trends in Aggregate Saving 
International Comparison 
To document the special features of Chinese saving in light of international 
experience, we make a cross-country comparison of national saving rates using the 
WDI (World Bank, 2010). The WDI defines gross domestic saving as GDP less the 
aggregate consumption expenditures based on data from national income accounts.   4
Using this standard definition, we compare China’s saving rates for the period of 
1978–2008 with those of countries from different income groups, BRIC economies of 
Brazil, Russia and India, and selected developed economies.   
Figure 1A shows that the rate of aggregate saving in China has remained 
persistently above 34 percent of the GDP since 1978, the year when systematic 
economic reforms began. Therefore, high saving in China has been a long-term 
phenomenon. Since 2000, there has been a surge in the saving rate, reaching a 
startling 53.1 percent of the GDP in 2007. The saving rates of middle-income and 
low-income groups have also increased but at a rate much slower than that of China. 
In 2006, the latest year with available data on the saving rates of all country groups, 
the saving rate of China (52.4%) was about 3.3 times higher than that of the low 
income group (16.1%) and 2.4 times higher than the world average (22.1%).   
China’s high saving also stands out among those of the BRIC economies, as 
shown in Figure 1B. In 2008, the national saving rate in China was 49.2 percent, 
whereas the rate for Russia was 36.3 percent, India 32.9 percent, and Brazil 19.1 
percent. Despite two erratic spikes in Russia’s saving series, there has been a recent 
upward trend in saving for all three countries. Between 1998 and 2008, the saving rate 
of Brazil increased by 4.1percentage points, Russia by 14.6 percentage points, and 
India by 11.9 percentage points 
In contrast to the rising saving observed in the large and fast-growing developing 
countries, the overall saving rates of industrialized economies have experienced a 
gradual decline, as seen in Figure 1C. In the early 1990s, the level of saving in China   5
was comparable with that of its rich East Asian neighbors, Japan and South Korea. 
However, the saving rate of Japan continually declined after reaching a peak of 34.4 
percent in 1991 until it dropped to a three-decade low of 25.2 percent in 2006. The 
saving rates of the US, France, and the UK have either stagnated or experienced 
chronic decline in the past three decades. Since 2000, the disparity in gross domestic 
saving rates between China and the major developed countries has widened. By 2006, 
the saving rate of China was 27.2 percentage points higher than that of Japan and 38.6 
percentage points higher than that of the US. By 2007, the gap in gross saving 
between China and South Korea grew to 22.1 percentage points, whereas the gaps in 
France and the UK increased to 29 and 35 percentage points, respectively.     
  
Components of Aggregate Saving 
The high and rising aggregate saving in China can be analyzed by source through the 
three components: households, enterprises, and the government. Earlier studies that 
analyzed by-sector saving include Qian (1988) for the period of 1978–1984, Kraay 
(2000) for 1978–1995, Kujis (2005, 2006) for 1990–2005, and Chamon and Prasad 
(2010)  for  1990–2005.                     
At the inception of reforms in China in 1978, total household saving only 
accounted for 6–7 percent of the GDP, whereas the government saving hovered 
around 15–18 percent of the GDP (Qian, 1988; Kraay, 2000). Between 1978 and 1984, 
the household saving continued to rise, and the government saving fell dramatically, 
maintaining the aggregate saving rate at a stable level. The decline in government 
savings persisted through the early 1990s.   6
In 1995, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) began to publish the FFA based 
on the physical transitions of the national income accounting in the Statistical 
Yearbook of China. With a three-year lag policy, the most recent data available for 
this paper cover the period of 1992–2007.
2 Whereas the WDI data cover a much 
longer period, the FFA data have the advantage of reporting the composition of gross 
domestic saving by household, business, and government, as well as information on 
incomes and expenditures within each of the sectors. Figure 2 presents three 
interesting observations.
3  First, aggregate saving in China remained at a high level of 
above 34.9 percent of the GDP for the entire period. Second, there was a recent surge 
in saving rate by almost 17 percent from 1999 to 2007. Finally, all three sectors 
contributed significantly to the upsurge of the gross national saving. Between 1999 
and 2007, the share of corporate saving rose from 14.6–18.8 percent of the GDP, the 
household saving from 16.7–22.2 percent, and the government from 2.6–10.8 percent. 
Overall, the largest percentage increase, by 8.2 percent of the GDP, was the saving of 
                                                            
2  See He and Cao (2007) and Ma and Wang (2010) for the analyses of Chinese aggregate saving using 
the FFA data.   
3 Yearly saving rates based on the FFA data have noticeable differences from the rates based on the 
WDI data as reported in Figure 1, although the long-term trends are generally consistent. Comparing 
these two data series, we find that from 1992 to 1999, the WDI measure was 2.8–6 percentage points 
higher than the FFA measure. In 1999, their difference amounted to 5 percentage points. Since 2000, 
however, the difference has become much smaller, except for 2006 when the FFA measure exceeded 
the WDI measure by 2.9 percentage points. Note that these two measures of domestic saving rates have 
the same definition, that is, (1- final consumption expenditure/GDP), and the final consumption 
includes household consumption and general government consumption expenditures. Although there is 
little difference in the ratio of government consumption to the GDP in the two data sets, the FFA data 
report a higher ratio of household consumption to GDP especially for the periods 1992–1999 and 
2005–2006. Therefore, the disparity in domestic saving rates comes mainly from the differences in 
household consumption expenditures to the GDP. This disparity reflects in part the content of 
household consumption in the two datasets. According to FFA statistics, household final consumption 
expenditure includes not only monetary spending but also in-kind consumption, which could result in 
higher ratios of household consumption to GDP in the FFA data. In addition, the WDI measure of the 
final consumption in the GDP also includes any statistical discrepancy in the use of resources relative 
to the supply of resources, which could contribute to the disparity in domestic saving rates between 
FFA and WDI data.     7
the government.     
 
The Chinese Saving Puzzle 
In light of the historical trends and international comparisons, we consider the 
Chinese saving puzzle to have four interrelated aspects: (a) persistently high saving 
rates between 34 and 53 percent of the GDP in the past 30 years; (b) an outlier in 
international comparisons, that is, having one of the highest saving rates among all 
nations since 2000, and an outlier in cross-country regressions of saving 
determination;
4 (c) surge in gross domestic saving by 11 percentage points between 
2000 and 2008 based on the WDI data;
5  and (d) household saving as a share of GDP 
experiencing the highest growth among the three sectors since the inception of 
reforms in 1978.
6 These observations jointly define the Chinese saving puzzle. We 
consider it a puzzle because the fundamental forces shaping these special saving 
patterns are still not well understood.   
  In what follows, we use the FFA data to investigate the sources and causes of the 
high and rising government and corporate saving in the period of 1992–2007 and use 
UHS data to examine household saving in the period of 1988–2007. The time 
coverage reflects data availability.         
 
III. Corporate Saving 
                                                            
4  Kraay (2000) uses a large sample of countries to investigate the cross-country determinants of saving 
and finds that economy-wide saving in China is nearly 10 percentage points higher than what would be 
expected based on standard determinants of national savings. 
5  Note that the FFA data reveal a generally consistent trend, although its data coverage ends in 2007.   
6  According to Qian (1988) and Kraay (2000), household saving accounted for only 6–7 percent of the 
GDP in the late 1970s. As Figure 2 shows, however, household saving as a share of the GDP climbed to 
22.2 percent in 2007, implying an increase of about 16 percent. In contrast, the combined savings by 
the government and enterprises stayed roughly the same at about 30 percent of the GDP in the 
beginning  and  ending  years  of  the  analysis.                      8
The high corporate and government saving during the earlier years of reform reflects 
the high-investment and heavy industry-oriented development strategy adopted in the 
central planning period. Between 1965 and 1977, the gross national saving of China 
averaged 27 percent of the GDP and had a small component of household saving 
(Kraay, 2000). As the state influence of enterprise accumulation diminished with the 
introduction of reforms, aggregate corporate saving declined to only about 13 percent 
of the GDP in the late 1990s. What forces drove up corporate saving by about 6 
percentage points of the GDP in the period of 1999–2007? 
  The trend of rising enterprise saving is most commonly documented using the 
FFA data from the national income accounts of China.
7  As defined by FFA, enterprise 
saving equals the value-added of both financial and non-financial companies minus 
labor compensation, production taxes, net asset payments, and net transfer payments.
8 
In China, total enterprise saving is equivalent to the “total disposable income” of the 
business sectors, but the concept is different from either net income or free cash flow 
in the standard corporate finance literature. It is a concept very close to net income 
plus depreciation and amortization.  Thus, the formation of fixed capital, capital 
transfers, changes in inventory, and equity investments are not included in the 
calculation  of  enterprise  saving.          
  Using this definition of corporate saving in Chinese statistics, the legacy of the 
high-accumulation strategy from the central planning and incomplete institutional 
                                                            
7 An exception is Bayoumi, Tong and Wei (this volume), who examine Chinese corporate saving behavior based 
on firm level data.   
8  More specifically, asset payments include interest payments, dividends, and land rentals, whereas 
transfers include corporate income tax, social insurance fees, social subsidies, and social welfare 
payments.        9
reforms can partially explain the high enterprise saving in the past three decades. For 
instance, the suppression of wages, low interest payments on loans, and low land 
rentals all tended to raise the disposable income of the enterprises, thus giving them 
more opportunities to save.
9 These forces of economic planning continued into the 
reform era despite a gradual decline in the magnitude of the distortions over time. 
However, aside from these institutional factors that influence the general level of 
business saving, we argue that several factors have helped elevate enterprise saving in 
t h e   p a s t   d e c a d e .                    
 
Rising Profitability of Enterprises 
The saving capacity of enterprises reflects their profitability. As shown in Figure 3, 
the profitability of enterprises has generally improved since the early 1990s. While 
the nominal firm profits increased more than 15 folds from 1992 to 2007, the ratio of 
profits to industrial value added also improved remarkably from about 21 percent in 
the late 1990s to close to 30 percent in 2007. Figure 4 provides corroborative 
evidence that the share of enterprise income in the GDP rose from 13 percent in the 
late 1990s to above 18 percent in 2007.   
The rise in corporate profitability is an outcome of a series of socioeconomic and 
institutional changes implemented in China throughout the reform period. For 
instance, the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the growth of private 
enterprises are found to have induced more innovative efforts and raised the labor and 
total factor productivity of the corporate sector (Jefferson and Su, 2006; Bai et al., 
                                                            
9  We are grateful to Leslie Young for making constructive suggestions on these arguments as well as 
referring us to the related literature.   10
2009). Labor market reforms involving the use of labor-incentive schemes, the 
relaxation of worker mobility restrictions, and especially the massive rural-urban 
migration have all contributed to the efficient functioning of firms. In particular, the 
large flow of rural labor to cities, which was estimated at around 135 million in 2007 
(Meng et al., 2010), has helped maintain low labor costs for business, a major factor 
behind China’s emergence as the workshop of the world (Yang et al., 2010). Moreover, 
China began implementing a large-scale privatization of SOEs in 1998 with the 
objectives of improving corporate governance and maintaining the competitiveness of 
the state sector in the national economy. From 1997 to 2003, the share of SOE 
workers in urban employment dropped from 54.6–26.8 percent as the result of 
enterprise restructuring (NBS, 1998, 2004). The productivity of the state sector rose, 
and the competitive pressure also spread to raise the productivity of the non-state 
sector.    
The rise in corporate saving, that is, 14.6–18.8 percent of the GDP from 
1999–2007, was also attributable to China’s remarkable expansion in export 
associated with its accession to the WTO. Beginning in the late 1990s, with the 
anticipation of joining the WTO, China’s export growth accelerated. The momentum 
of trade expansion continued after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 as trade 
barriers and tariffs continued to fall. Between 1999 and 2007, the export growth 
reached an unprecedented 26 percent per annum (NBS, 2008). This expansion in 
external demand handed China an opportunity to realize its potential comparative 
advantage in trade. When exports were combined with equally remarkable FDI   11
inflows as well as the imports of sophisticated intermediate inputs, these factors 
jointly created a powerful force to increase firm productivity and profits. 
Trade expansion, and thus increases in corporate revenue, was facilitated by 
trade policies in China. Since 1998, after the Asian financial crisis, China has initiated 
a trade-promoting policy of rewarding tax rebates for exports (TRE). Since then, TRE 
has become an important macroeconomic management policy. The value of the rebate 
increased substantially after China’s accession to the WTO. Figure 5 shows that the 
total volume of TRE increased from 115 billion Yuan in 2002 to 586.6 billion in 2008. 
The size of these tax rebates was highly significant: in 2006, the total TRE received 
by exporting firms was equivalent to 10 percent of aggregate corporate saving and 
about 14 percent of government tax revenue in the same year. The TRE remained at 
high levels throughout 2004–2008. Therefore, the expanded external demand and 
favorable trade policies both helped raise the corporate earnings of Chinese firms with 
the accession of China to the WTO.   
 
Costs of Financing, Dividend Payments, and Labor Compensations 
While export expansion and tax rebate added directly to the revenue of firms, 
maintaining the low cost of production also contributed to the rise in the disposable 
incomes of enterprises. Ma and Wang (2010) find that net interest payments as share 
of the GDP by the non-financial corporate sector dropped by 50 percent between 1992 
and 2007. In particular, SOEs financed their loans and paid their debts at interest rates 
much lower than the prevailing market rates. If SOEs actually paid at market interest 
rates, their existing profits, and thus their saving, would have been greatly reduced   12
(Ferri and Liu, 2009). Moreover, enterprises managed to control labor compensation 
during the same period. As shown in Figure 6, the share of labor compensation of 
employees in the total value added of enterprises declined from an average of 41.2 
percent in the 1990s to 37.5 percent in the 2000s, helping raise the enterprise saving 
capacity. Although some stockholders earn dividends, total dividend payments only 
accounted for a small proportion of the enterprise value added. Despite an upward 
trend in dividend payments, the ratio of dividend to value added was still less than 0.5 
percent by 2007 (Figure 6). Part of the story is that the Chinese government did not 
ask SOEs to pay dividends until 2008 even though they had enjoyed improved profits 
since the state-sector restructuring in the late 1990s. These aggregate statistics appear 
to be consistent with firm-level data reported in Zhang (2008) that for a large sample 
of Chinese firms in the period of 1999–2003, the average and median dividends to 
earnings ratios were 0.35 and 0.16, respectively. Lower dividends translate directly to 
more retained corporate earnings based on the FFA statistics.   
 
Imperfect Capital Markets 
Weaknesses in China’s financial sector motivated the enterprises, especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to rely on their own saving to finance fixed-asset 
investments. Despite the systematic financial reforms since the middle 1990s, 
including the reconstruction of non-performance loans, banks in China still play a 
limited role in channeling saving from frugal households to the enterprise sector (e.g., 
Hofman and Kuijs, 2006). 
Table 1 reports the sources of funding for fixed-asset investments in the period of   13
1995–2007. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that bank credits are the main source 
of financing, the share of domestic loans remained below 21 percent of the total 
investments throughout the period. Instead, self-raised funds always accounted for the 
largest share of contribution to investment. It is worth pointing out that the share of 
self-raised funds in the total investment increased over time, rising from just below 50 
percent in the middle 1990s to 64.8 percent in 2008. In other words, enterprise 
investment relied more on self-retained earnings, whereas the importance of domestic 
loans generally declined in the last decade. Therefore, the high saving of enterprises, 
particularly among SMEs, can be interpreted as reflecting the difficulties in obtaining 
financing from state banks because of the lack of collaterals required to secure loans.   
By 2008, the state budget and FDI contributed to about 7 percent of the total 
fixed-asset investment. Informal and private financing channels, as represented by the 
“others” category, accounted for 13.5 percent of the total financing; this share is 
comparable in size with domestic loans. Therefore, despite the development and 
commercialization of capital markets in China, formal financing through bank loans is 
still limited. The weak financial sector creates the incentives for enterprise saving. 
 
IV. Government Saving   
Government in the FFA data refers to all levels of administrative units and non-profit 
institutions affiliated with the state and local governments. Table 2 presents the data 
series on consumption, saving, and detailed components of government disposable 
income. The figures are expressed in nominal terms because selecting price deflators 
for different variables is prone to arbitrariness, and our primary interest is the changes   14
in yearly saving rates based on current prices. The share of government saving in 
GDP fluctuated at a level below 4.4 percent in the period of 1992–1999, reaching the 
lowest point at 2.6 percent in 1999. However, the figure had climbed since then, 
reaching 10.8 percent in 2007. 
  The government’s disposable income, which mainly consists of value added from 
government production, incomes from properties, taxes on all production, income 
taxes, and social insurance revenue but minus labor compensations, rose from 1608.9 
billion Yuan in 1999 to 6308.4 billion Yuan in 2007, as indicated in column (6) of 
Table 1. The rise in tax revenues on production, as reported in column (3), was the 
largest contributor to the growth in government income during this period. The net tax 
increased by 3058.5 billion Yuan, accounting for 65 percent of the increase in the 
disposable income of government. The institutional foundation behind the rise in tax 
revenues can be traced back to the famous 1994 Fiscal Reform in China that managed 
to reverse a declining trend in state revenues beginning in the mid-1980s. The reform 
aimed to boost revenue collections and reclaim the majority of the total revenue by 
the central government (Bahl, 1999; Wong and Bird, 2008). From having a low share 
of net revenue in the GDP in the earlier 1990s, the effective tax system, when 
combined with an average annual GDP growth of about 10 percent, resulted in 
continued  rise  in  government  revenue  from  1999  to  2007.                         
  The second largest contributing factor to government disposable income is net 
current transfers. According to more detailed FFA sources not reported in Table 1, the 
government collected 1195.5 billion Yuan of income taxes and 1081.2 billion Yuan of   15
social insurance fees in 2007, but only spent 1028 billion Yuan on social welfare 
payments, social insurance provisions, and other transfers. As a result, the government 
had a net gain of 1248.9 billion Yuan in net transfers in 2007, which is an increase of 
1157.1 billion Yuan from the 1992 level, accounting for 25 percent of the growth in 
government disposable income during the same period. Overall, the combined 
increase in taxes on production and transfers added to about 90 percent of the growth 
in  disposable  income  from  1992  to  2007.          
Compared with the sharp increase in state income, the total growth of 2147.4 
billion Yuan in consumption is still modest. As a result, government saving increased 
by 2147.4 billion Yuan, translating to an 8.2 percentage-point increase in its share in 
the GDP. This tally is consistent with the popular view of “Nation Rich, People Poor,” 
which is now widely discussed in the public media in China. A piece of corroborative 
evidence is that the share of household income in the GDP declined from 68.6 percent 
in 1996 to 57.5 percent in 2007 (Figure 4). Although this view correctly describes the 
changes in income positions of the government in the past two decades, China’s tax 
revenue as a percentage of the GDP is still lower than that of major developed 
economies,  such  as  Japan,  Germany,  and  the  US.           
 
V. Household Saving 
Household saving in China rose substantially in the past three decades along with 
economic reforms and fast income growth. As noted earlier, household saving only 
accounted for 6–7 percent of the GDP in the late 1970s but grew to about 22 percent 
in 2007 based on the FFA data (Figure 2). In what follows, we use more detailed UHS   16
data to document the major features of the Chinese household saving in the period of 
1988–2007. In light of these stylized facts, we provide a critical overview of the 
existing literature and present our views on the main factors behind the rise in 
household saving in China.     
Data and Stylized Facts 
The data we use come from 20 consecutive years of the UHS conducted by China's 
NBS. The computer usable form of data began in 1988; the latest data are from 2007 
due to the NBS one-year-lag policy for releasing household surveys. The UHS data 
record basic conditions of urban households and detailed information on income, 
employment, demographic characteristics of all household members, and detailed 
consumption information in each calendar year. Our sample comes from five large 
provinces (i.e., Liaoning, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Shannxi) and one 
municipality (i.e., Beijing). These provinces are representatives of China both in 
terms of income dispersions and geographical coverage.   
Household saving is computed as the difference between disposable income and 
consumption expenditures on food, clothing, housing services, transportation, 
communication, entertainment, education, medical care, and other miscellaneous 
items. We also make use of demographic variables, such as young dependency (i.e., 
the ratio of children below 16 to adults aged between 16 and 55 for women and 60 for 
men) and old dependency (i.e., the ratio of the elderly above 55 for women and above 
60 for men to the working age population), to determine whether saving varies with 
demographic structures. We limit our analysis to households whose heads are aged   17
between 25 and 70, and exclude self-employed families due to difficulties in 
computing family incomes.   
Table 3 reports the basic summary of statistics on the urban household sample. 
The average household income grew from 14,918 Yuan in 1988 to 49,061 Yuan in 
2007, increasing by more than three folds during the 20-year period. Likewise, the 
average household consumption increased substantially, although at a rate slower than 
income growth. As a result, the rate of urban household saving increased from 5.6 
percent in 1988 to 26.9 percent in 2007. These trends are generally consistent with the 
documented rise in household saving based on aggregate data. 
 
Household Saving by Region and Income Level 
Figure 7 shows that the Chinese household saving is positively related to household 
incomes. More specifically, the four lines in the graph indicate the saving rates of four 
income groups defined by their income quantiles. The saving rates of the lowest 
income group (0–25 percent) fluctuated between 5 and 10 percent in most years, 
ending at 7 percent in 2007. In contrast, the saving rate of the highest income quantile 
(75–100 percent) began at 10 percent in 1988 and increased steadily and rapidly to 
above 34 percent in 2007, a level that is 27 percentage points higher than that of the 
lowest income group in that year. This pattern of higher saving among richer families 
appears to be consistent with the observations in developed economies (e.g., Dynan et 
al., 2004). Therefore, for China, the rise in household saving appears to be related to 
the growing income inequality during the process of economic transition. These 
patterns imply that income transfers from the rich to the poor can raise the propensity   18
to consume in China today. We will revisit this point when discussing the effects of 
proposed government policies on household saving in the concluding section of this 
chapter.  
Saving rates by region are presented in Figure 8, where we take a three-year 
moving average saving rate for each region to mitigate fluctuations in the measure 
because of the small size of the sample. The figure reveals that richer provinces, such 
as Zhejiang and Beijing, have much higher average saving rates than the poor 
provinces of Liaoning, Sichuan, and Shannxi. The gap in saving rate was initially 
small in the late 1980s and early 1990s but grew significantly to about 10 percentage 
points across regions in 2007. Overall, these patterns are consistent with the 
documented saving rates by income. 
 
Demographic Structures and Life Cycle Saving Profiles 
Household saving decisions are pertinently related to their demographic structures.   
As revealed in Table 4, family structures in urban China experienced substantial 
changes in the past two decades. The average size of the household dropped from 3.5 
in 1988 to 2.9 in 2007,
10 whereas the average age of the household head increased 
from 43.2 to 47.3, suggesting the advent of an aging society. The most striking pattern 
in the table is the sharp decline in child dependency, which is defined as the 
percentage of households with children below 16, from 68 percent in 1988 to 37 
percent in 2007. The decline in child dependency is an outcome of the strict 
                                                            
10  A household is defined as a residential unit where family members live and have meals together for an extended 
period of time during the year of the survey. Therefore, family members who live outside the residential unit are 
not counted as members of a household.     19
implementation of China’s one-child policy that began in earnest in 1979. 
We plot the saving rates for households of different demographic structures in 
Figure 9. Persistent increases in saving rates are shown across different types of 
households, rising by about 21 percentage points in the 20-year period on average.  
Since the late 1990s, households with elderly experienced faster growth in saving than 
the whole sample. Later on, we will discuss that this trend is consistent with the 
decline in pension incomes for the retired; thus, families with elderly tend to save 
more to insure smooth consumption. In contrast, households with children tend to 
save less. This observation is consistent with the fact that costs of children have risen 
rapidly in recent years. Therefore, for households with middle-aged heads, the 
increase in their expenditures on raising children appears to have more than offset 
their higher earnings, thus dragging down their household saving relative to those of 
other households. 
Figure 10 presents the age-saving profiles by age of the household head for the 
periods of 1988–1990 and 2005–2007. These profiles are perhaps the most important 
empirical patterns we have documented for the household sector that shed light on the 
changes in their saving over the two decades. As some age cells contain limited 
number of observations, we deploy three-age and three-year moving average saving 
rates to smooth the data series. The 1988–1990 age-saving profile reveals a relatively 
flat “hump-shape,” which resembles the typical life cycle saving profiles observed in 
other economies (e.g., Modigliani, 1970). However, the saving profile for 2007 
exhibits a dramatic change: (a) saving rates for households of all ages increased   20
substantially, and (b) the profile turns into a “U-shape” over the life cycle; that is, the 
young and the old saved relatively more than the middle aged. These patterns are 
consistent with the observations made by Chamon and Prasad (2010) for selected 
Chinese provinces in the period of 1995–2005 and those documented in Song and 
Yang (2010) and Ge, Yang and Zhang (2011) using the national sample of UHS data 
covering the period 1992–2007. The two features of increasing household saving and 
the “U-shaped” age-earning profiles present a challenge for understanding the 
determination of household saving in China.     
 
Understanding China’s High Household Saving 
Given the size of the Chinese economy and the importance of the household sector, 
considerable research has been devoted to understanding family saving decisions. A 
number of early studies applied classical models of saving, which originated from the 
studies of saving behavior in the developed market economies, to the case of China. 
Among the well-known models are the Keynesian absolute-income hypothesis, 
Modigliani-Brumberg’s life-cycle theory, and Friedman’s permanent-income 
hypothesis. These studies, including Chow (1985), Qian (1998), Wang (1995), and 
Modigliani and Cao (2004), tested alternative hypotheses but ended with inconclusive 
findings for the saving behavior of the Chinese. One challenging fact that hardly 
reconciles with theory is that, instead of consuming more to smoothen lifetime 
consumption, Chinese households continued to save more in anticipation of higher 
future incomes. Moreover, the age-saving profiles of Chinese households gradually   21
turned into a U-shaped pattern (Figure 10), which is inconsistent with the 
hump-shaped profile implied by the life cycle hypothesis.   
Habit formation is an alternative theory that can explain the rise in household 
saving during a period of rapid income growth (Carroll and Weil, 1994). The notion of 
consumption inertia is related to a culture-based explanation to saving behavior. As 
the Chinese are known to be thrifty, their consumption growth could have lagged 
behind their income growth during the reform period, thus leading to higher 
household saving. This argument is supported by the empirical finding that 
provincial-level variations in household saving over time and space are influenced by 
the lagged saving rates, a result consistent with the existence of inertia or persistence 
(Horioka and Wan, 2007). However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. As 
Modigliani and Cao (2004) argue, the traditional and commonsensical explanation 
(e.g., why Chinese households are thrifty) counts little, if at all. Indeed, from the 
1950s to the mid-1970s, household saving rates in China were below 5 percent, and 
the sudden spurt occurred during the reform period. Studies based on household data 
also could not find evidence showing that the current consumption growth is 
positively correlated with the past consumption growth (Chamon and Prasad, 2010). 
Given that older cohorts usually carry more cultural tradition than younger cohorts, 
Zhou (2007) rejects the thrifty factor as an important determinant of Chinese 
household saving. Using the 1988–2003 China Health and Nutrition Surveys, he finds 
that younger Chinese cohorts actually have a higher propensity to save than older 
cohorts  after  controlling  for  other  saving  determinants.           22
Demographic changes induced by China’s population-control policies could have 
an effect on household saving through two channels. First, as the nonworking 
population consisting of the young and the old consumes without producing an 
income, a rise in their share in the population tends to reduce national household 
saving. Second, in a developing country without a mature social security system, 
children often provide old-age support to their parents, and thus children act as an 
effective substitute for life-cycle saving. Motivated by these factors, Modigliani and 
Cao (2004) use the ratio of employed population to the number of minors up to age 15 
to approximate demographic change. They find that the decline in the young 
population dependency for the period of 1953–2000 increased Chinese household 
saving through both effects of “less mouths to feed” and old-age security. However, 
this time series evidence is not confirmed by panel data studies. Neither aggregate 
dependency ratio (e.g., Kraay, 2000) nor separate accounts of the young and the old 
dependency ratios (Horioka and Wan, 2007) are found to have a significant effect on 
the household saving rates across Chinese provinces. Applying cohort analysis to data 
from the UHS, Chamon and Prasad (2010) reach a similar conclusion that 
demographic structural shifts do not go very far in explaining saving behavior in 
China. 
  Competitive saving motive is yet another demographic factor related to the 
imbalanced sex ratio in China (Wei and Zhang, 2011). As the two authors argue, the 
traditional preference for a son is widespread in China. With restrictive population 
control policies, many families use the inexpensive type-B ultrasonic technology to   23
detect the gender of fetuses and engage in sex-selective abortion, leading to a severe 
imbalance in the sex ratio. The intensified competition among men for potential wives 
stimulates households with a son to spend thriftily to accumulate wealth in order to 
gain a competitive edge in the marriage market. Building on this idea, Wei and Zhang 
use provincial panel data (1978–2006) to test the effect of sex ratio imbalance on 
household saving. They show that the imbalanced sex ratio significantly increases 
household savings, with approximately 68 percent of the increase in rural saving rate 
and 18 percent of that in the urban rate being attributed to the rise in the sex ratio.             
  Economic transitions in China not only involved a decline in the size of the state 
sector but also made a transition from public provision of education, health care, and 
housing services to private expenditures on these lumpy purchases. The uncertainty 
associated with the transition could trigger precautionary motives to save. In 
particular, by the mid-1990s, the Chinese government realized that its gradualist 
reform policy could no longer manage the mounting losses of SOEs and decided to 
take more aggressive steps, first allowing the privatization of small and medium SOEs 
and then, beginning in 1997, moving forward with more aggressive restructuring. The 
objective was to shut down losing SOEs, establish modern forms of corporate 
governance, and de-link the provision of social services from individual employers. 
This would be accomplished through the privatization of housing and the shifting of 
the federal responsibility of health insurance, unemployment insurance, and pension 
provisions to the local governments, employers, and employees themselves. These 
aggressive reforms led to mass layoffs in SOEs. From 1996 to 2002, about 32 million   24
workers were laid off from the state sector. Based on the 2001 China Urban Labor 
Survey and the 2000 Population Census, Giles et al. (2005) estimate that the 
unemployment rate of urban permanent residents increased from 6.1 percent in 1996 
to 11.1 percent in 2002. Using independent population data sources, Knight and Xue 
(2006) arrive at almost similar estimates, showing that China’s urban unemployment 
rate increased gradually from 7.7 percent in 1995 to 11.5 percent in 2000.         
Given the earnings uncertainty and unemployment risk combined with liquidity 
constraints and incomplete unemployment insurance, Chinese urban households that 
experienced past income uncertainty appeared to have increased their propensity to 
save in the period of 1995–1999 (Meng, 2003). Moreover, the predicted probability of 
displacement had an even stronger effect on saving for households without 
unemployed members. Although these findings are robust for the household sample 
drawn from the specific period, reconciling the findings with the macroeconomic facts 
is difficult. The reason is that, when the employment uncertainty associated with 
state-sector restructuring continued to rise and reached its peak in the late 1990s, 
household saving rate did not increase accordingly but rather fluctuated within a 
narrow range of 16.2–18.1 percent during the second half of the 1990s (Table 3). 
Therefore, the precautionary saving motive stemming from employment uncertainty 
does  not  seem  to  explain  well  the  surge  in  household  saving  since  2000.              
Accompanied with the state sector reforms, budget allocations for education, 
health care, and housing services declined substantially. For instance, expenditures on 
health and education only accounted for 2 percent of household consumptions in 1995,   25
but this share rose to 14 percent by 2005. Chamon and Prasad (2010) argue that these 
rising private financial burdens could induce higher household saving, as younger 
families accumulate assets for future education spending, older families prepare for 
uncertain health expenditures, and most people save to prepare for mortgage 
payments or housing upgrades. Although these are plausible factors, their quantitative 
effects on savings are difficult to assess. Conceptually, as most of the young adults 
have already finished their own education, there is no need to save for that purpose; 
they might have incentives to accumulate assets for their children’s education. 
However, the increase in their saving could be offset by the reduced saving of older 
families who have to incur higher education costs for their children who are already in 
school. Similar compositional effects exist for health care and housing expenditures, 
as higher costs tend to reduce the saving rates of those households that incur higher 
expenditures in specific years. So far, existing studies have not yet systematically 
assessed the combined effects on saving across different population groups. 
  The changes in age-saving profiles between the periods of 1988–1990 and 
2005–2007 shown in Figure 10 reveal several key features of the saving behavior of 
the Chinese households. A successful model that resolves the Chinese household 
saving puzzle should explain not only the rise in household saving but also the 
U-shaped age-saving profiles over the life cycle in recent years. Two recent studies, 
Song and Yang (2010), and Ge, Yang, and Zhang (2011), are particularly motivated to 
explain the stylized patterns of Chinese household savings as shown in Figure 10. 
Using the comprehensive data from Chinese UHS covering the period of 1992–2007,   26
Song and Yang document three dramatic changes in the life cycle earnings in China’s 
fast-growing environment that are new to the existing literature: (a) there are large 
upward shifts in the earnings of successive younger worker cohorts, (b) individual 
age-earning profiles have become flattened during the past two decades, and (c) the 
aggregate pension replacement rate, which is defined as the ratio of average pension 
per retiree to average wages per worker in specific years, declined from about 80 
percent in the early 1990s to a range of 52–58 percent in 2007. Incorporating these 
features of the Chinese economy into a dynamic optimization model of heterogeneous 
agents, they show that an otherwise standard intertemporal choice model can account 
well for the recent surge in household saving as well as the U-shaped age-saving 
p r o f i l e s   o v e r   t h e   l i f e   c y c l e .                          
  Ge, Yang, and Zhang (2011) emphasize the interplay between China’s population 
control policies and saving behavior based on an overlapping generation model. They 
find that, among several intergenerational linkages, reduced fertility resulting from the 
implementation of the one-child policy contributed significantly to the recent rise in 
household saving. Their arguments, complementing the findings of Song and Yang 
(2010), help explain several special features of ho u s e h o l d   s a v i n g   i n   C h i n a .               
 
VI. Prospects of China’s High National Saving 
The high and rising national saving is a critical component of China’s macroeconomic 
imbalances and is believed by some to be an important contributor to the global 
saving glut. Indeed, the high aggregate saving rate of about 50 percent of the GDP in   27
recent years not only surpassed the peak saving levels of Japan, Korea, and other East 
Asian economies during the years of their miracle growth rates but also has been the 
highest in the world among economies of significant size. This remarkably high 
national saving has supported China’s high-investment, export-led growth model. As 
national saving has exceeded the total investment in recent years, and exports have 
exceeded imports, China’s large current account surplus has become an important part 
of the global imbalances. We show in this paper that corporate, household, and 
government sectors have all contributed significantly to the upsurge in national saving 
in the past decade. The key causes include China’s fast economic growth, accession to 
the WTO accession, rising corporate profits, changes in life cycle earnings, pension 
system,  other  provisions  of  social  services,  and  the  demographic  transition.                
  In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy is facing a 
series of challenges; responses to these challenges will likely evolve into systematic 
structural adjustments. After more than a decade of heavy public investments in basic 
infrastructure, the diminishing returns on similar projects will likely set in, and due to 
external pressure, China is likely to experience relatively moderate export growth in 
the future and has no choice but to pursue a more balanced current account. These 
broad projections imply that China will have to rely increasingly on vigorous 
domestic demands to assure sustained growth, structurally reforming the previous 
high-investment, export-led growth strategy. Hence, the transition from a high-saving 
to a high-consumption regime will be at the center of public attention and policy.     
  Based on the previous analysis of saving determinants and imminent   28
macroeconomic, demographic, and policy trends into the future, we assert that the 
Chinese national saving may have already peaked at around 2007. A main reason 
behind this judgment is the likely slowdown in China’s future growth, which is 
projected at an average annual rate of 8.1 percent for 2011–2015 by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2010) and an even lower range of 5.37–7.27 percent for 2010–2020 by 
the Asian Development Bank (Lee and Hong, 2010). The national saving is positively 
correlated with economic growth (e.g., Carroll and Summers, 1991; Deaton and 
Paxson, 2000). Using 2.52 as the growth elasticity of national saving for China for 
1978–2000 (Modigliani and Cao, 2004), the decline in average GDP growth from 9.8 
percent in the past decade to 8.1 percent as forecast by the World Bank for the next 
five years would reduce China’s aggregate saving rate by about 4.3 percentage points. 
Our previous analysis is suggestive of the channels of the effect. Slower GDP growth 
will mean reduced growth in value-added production tax and reduced income tax for 
the government, and therefore a lower saving rate if the government’s consumption 
growth is held stable. Our foregoing analysis of corporate earnings suggests that 
s l o w e r   G D P   g r o w t h   w i l l   a l s o   i m p l y   r e d u c e d   c a p a c i t y   f o r   c o r p o r a t e   s a v i n g .                          
  The corporate sector will likely have a lower saving/GDP ratio in the foreseeable 
future because of the gradual decline over time in China’s gains resulting from its 
accession to the WTO, the initiation of dividend payments for the state sector, and the 
pending increase in labor costs. As the largest shareholder, the state did not require 
SOEs to pay dividends in the past. However, with rising profits after the state-sector 
restructuring in the late 1990s, the Chinese government started to require dividend   29
payments in 2008. This policy could squeeze corporate saving.   
Moreover, reports of labor unrest in China are increasing, including news on 
labor strikes in Toyota and Honda joint-venture plants and the string of worker 
suicides at the Foxconn facilities in early 2010. Sentiments favoring the protection of 
the rights of workers have grown in China as revealed by both media and government 
sources. By July 2010, 18 provinces had announced increases in minimum wages by 
an average of 20 percent. Nationwide increases in the minimum wage will likely 
spread to nine more provinces by the end of the year. Given the decline in the share of 
labor income in the GDP (Figure 4), there have been reports that the Chinese 
government plans to raise the wages of production workers systematically as a way to 
boost domestic production and move the economy away from the reliance on exports 
for growth (Ho, 2010). The National Development and Reform Commission, which 
formulates and coordinates national economic policies, have been developing an 
income redistribution reform plan that is likely to be incorporated into the 12
th 
five-year plan for the period of 2011–2015. Although we do not intend to analyze the 
efficiency loss and welfare consequences of implementing such policies, transferring 
income from high-income to low-income groups under Chinese conditions, ceteris 
paribus, may indeed lower the average household saving rate because low-income 
families have higher propensity to consume (Figure 7). In addition, higher labor costs 
may suppress the profits of enterprises, thus reducing the capacity of corporate 
e n t i t i e s   t o   s a v e .                                            
  Other evolving forces are also likely to reduce household saving in the   30
foreseeable future. The inevitable slowdown in the growth of labor earnings will 
likely occur across all age groups in conjunction with a gradual steepening of 
age-earning profiles, a reversal of what is observed during the period of extraordinary 
income growth (Song and Yang, 2010). Over time, the life cycle earnings in China 
will converge gradually to the typical earnings profiles observed in more advanced 
economies. The combined effects of slower earnings growth and the steepening of 
age-earnings profiles will reduce household saving. As Song and Yang point out, the 
existing pension contributions under the three-pillared system have fallen far behind 
the targeted levels. However, in the coming years, the pension system is likely to be 
improved to meet the targeted provisions better. A more robust retirement system will 
lead to two consequences. First, with a higher level of pension replacement and thus 
less retirement risk, individuals will have less pressure to save during their working 
time. Second, a more complete implementation of the three-pillared pension system 
will gradually raise the contribution of employers from the current 5 percent of 
average wages to the policy target of 17 percent wage taxes. This change will again 
r e d u c e   t h e   c a p a c i t y   o f   e n t e r p r i s e s   t o   s a v e .                  
  Population aging in the next several decades will have an effect on aggregate 
saving as well. According to projections made by the United Nations Population 
Council, China’s dependency ratio, which is defined as the sum of the young aged 14 
or below and the old aged 65 or above divided by the working population aged 
between 15 and 64, has reached the lowest level at 38.5 percent in 2010 (Figure 11). 
However, this ratio will rise dramatically to 64.7 percent in 2050, a level comparable   31
to the US figure of 67.7 percent in that year. What drives this rising trend is age 
dependency: the percentage of population aged 65 or above will increase from the 
current 11.5 percent to an astounding 38.9 percent in 2050, a level higher than that of 
Japan (37.8 percent) and the US (21.6 percent) projected for that year. Rising 
dependency ratio, especially for the old, will likely reduce aggregate household 
saving through not only the more mouths to feed effects but also the fact that old 
dependency is generally associated with lower personal saving in high-income 
economies. This demographic trend has already set in to influence saving, labor 
markets,  and  other  aspects  of  the  Chinese  economy.       
The reasons behind the high and rising national saving in China in the last 
decade are complex. Our medium-term outlook suggests a declining trend in Chinese 
saving that will help facilitate the transition from an investment-driven growth model 
to a growth paradigm that increasingly relies on the role of domestic consumption. 
Radical policy interventions that aim to stimulate consumption, such as the proposed 
dramatic increases in minimum wage and income-doubling plan for production 
workers in five years, would be risky and unwise. Our view is that reliance on the 
momentum of market and demographic forces, when combined with policies such as 
building a robust social security system, can help China achieve a successful 
transition towards a more balanced growth.   32
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Year  State Budget  Domestic Loans FDI  Self-raising Funds  Others 
1995  3.03   20.46   11.19   51.88   13.45  
1996  2.68   19.58   11.76   47.74   18.24  
1997  2.76   18.93   10.63   49.71   17.97  
1998  4.17   19.30   9.11   48.81   18.61  
1999  6.22   19.24   6.74   49.20   18.59  
2000  6.37   20.32   5.12   49.28   18.91  
2001  6.70   19.06   4.56   49.79   19.89  
2002  7.02   19.67   4.63   50.65   18.04  
2003  4.59   20.55   4.43   53.65   16.78  
2004  4.37   18.49   4.41   55.35   17.39  
2005  4.39   17.25   4.21   58.26   15.89  
2006  3.93   16.47   3.64   59.75   16.21  
2007  3.88   15.28   3.40   60.59   16.84  
2008  4.35   14.46   2.90   64.79   13.50  
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009. Table 2: Sources of Government Disposable Income and Saving 
year 
















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                             
1992  303.7  230.8 385.5  –12.2  92.7  538.9  420.3  118.6  4.4 
1993  352.3  271.3 546.0  –17.3  84.5  694.3  548.8  145.6  4.1 
1994  422.8  317.1 742.5  –26.5  71.0  892.7  739.8  152.9  3.2 
1995  477.8  372.7 842.5  –37.3  81.3  991.6  837.9  153.8  2.5 
1996  517.6  364.8 1061.6  –48.4  91.0  1257.0  996.4  260.7  3.7 
1997  582.1  427.8 1222.1  –43.0  102.9  1436.3  1121.9  314.4  4.0 
1998  678.9  534.3 1375.4  –47.1  39.1  1512.0  1235.9  276.1  3.3 
                       
1999  735.1  615.2 1449.8  –52.7  91.8  1608.9  1371.7  237.2  2.6 
2000  780.9  637.2 1607.5  –21.5  161.9  1891.6  1566.1  325.5  3.3 
2001  911.1  719.7 1836.1  –28.2  230.1  2229.8  1766.5  463.3  4.2 
2002  1138.9  876.3 2052.4  –35.1  243.8  2523.6  1912.0  611.6  5.1 
2003  1341.9  999.5 2330.5  –54.6  387.7  3006.0  2061.5  944.5  7.0 
2004  1420.2  1107.4 2364.1  –69.8  445.0  3052.2  2319.9  732.3  4.6 
2005  1564.3  1276.4 2954.2  –25.0  608.1  3825.1  2660.6  1164.6  6.4 
2006  1817.3  1369.7 3521.8  –7.9  940.6  4902.1  3011.8  1890.3  8.9 
2007  2116.4  1596.6 4508.2  31.6  1248.9  6308.4  3519.1  2789.4  10.8 
                            
Note: All figures are in nominal billion Yuan. Total disposable income in column (6) = (1) + (3) + (4) + (5) – (2). Saving in column 
(8) = (6) – (7).Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Urban Household Sample, 1988-2007 
 
Year  No. of Observations 
Income  Consumption  Saving Rate 
(2007 Yuan)  (2007 Yuan)  (%) 
1988  2,869   14,918   14,083   5.6 
1989  2,683   14,521   12,905   11.1 
1990  2,977   15,456   13,093   15.3 
1991  2,998   16,453   14,178   13.8 
1992  3,673   18,904   15,885   16.0 
1993  3,698   20,208   16,973   16.0 
1994  3,713   22,308   18,584   16.7 
1995  3,727   22,914   19,212   16.2 
1996  3,717   23,651   19,473   17.7 
1997  3,704   24,472   20,363   16.8 
1998  3,782   25,707   21,430   16.6 
1999  3,680   26,364   21,648   17.9 
2000  4,077   29,124   23,849   18.1 
2001  3,656   31,668   25,090   20.8 
2002  9,813   30,166   24,295   19.5 
2003  10,906   32,281   25,670   20.5 
2004  12,748   36,196   28,377   21.6 
2005  14,459   40,312   31,124   22.8 
2006  14,204   44,184   33,338   24.5 
2007  15,260   49,061   35,862   26.9 
 















1988  3.5  43.2  10.1  0.68  0.11 
1989  3.5  43.8  10.3  0.66  0.12 
1990  3.4  44.5  10.3  0.63  0.11 
1991  3.3  43.9  10.6  0.64  0.10 
1992  3.3  44.7  10.9  0.62  0.10 
1993  3.2  45.2  10.9  0.60  0.10 
1994  3.2  45.7  11.0  0.58  0.12 
1995  3.2  45.5  11.1  0.57  0.12 
1996  3.2  46.1  11.2  0.54  0.12 
1997  3.2  45.7  11.2  0.53  0.12 
1998  3.2  46.0  11.3  0.50  0.13 
1999  3.1  46.4  11.3  0.47  0.12 
2000  3.1  47.2  11.4  0.44  0.14 
2001  3.1  47.3  11.4  0.43  0.13 
2002  3.0  47.9  11.4  0.39  0.12 
2003  3.0  47.8  11.5  0.38  0.11 
2004  2.9  48.2  11.6  0.35  0.12 
2005  2.9  48.2  11.6  0.36  0.13 
2006  2.9  48.3  11.7  0.34  0.12 
2007  2.9  47.3  11.9  0.37  0.11 
 
Source: CHUS data, 1988-2007. 
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Source: NBS (1995-2009). 
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Source: NBS (1995-2009). 























Source: NBS (1995-2009). 
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Source: NBS (2003-2009). 
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Source: NBS (1995-2009). 
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Source: UHS data, 1988-2007. 























Source: UHS data, 1988-2007. 
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Source: UHS data, 1988-2007. 
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Source: UHS data, 1988-2007. 
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